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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the gaming industry has grown exponentially over the
past 25 years.1 Although it has become a popular hobby nationally, with wide-
spread acceptance since the mid-1990s,2 the recent decade has seen numerous
jurisdictions, including the federal government, attempt to strictly regulate or
even prohibit various forms of gaming.3 This wave of regulation has predomi-
nately been contained at the local and state level,4 and North Carolina’s recent
legislative and judicial history reflects this trend.5
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1 R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger of Law
and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 MISS. L.J. 565, 567 (2002) (noting the predomi-
nance of the institution of gambling throughout history as compared to its recent rise in
economic significance in the United States).
2 Erick S. Lee, Play Ball!: Substituting Current Federal Non-Regulation of Fantasy Sports
Leagues with Limited Supervision of Hyper-Competitive Leagues, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 53, 58–59 (2009).
3 Lisa Boikess, Note, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006: The Pit-
falls of Prohibition, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 152–53 (2008) (noting that the
trend of legalizing gambling slowed in 2006 after new, stricter federal regulations on gam-
bling were passed).
4 Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regu-
lation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 252 (2001) (noting that regula-
tion of gambling in America has predominately been the domain of local and state
government bodies).
5 Ashleigh N. Renfro, Comment, All In with Jack High: DiCristina as the Final Surge to
Federally Legalize Online Texas Hold’em Poker, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 751, 763-764 (2014)
(noting that most gambling regulation is left to the states and most states allow some form of
gambling. North Carolina fits into this category as although its gambling regulations prohibit
gambling, the statutes do make exceptions for some activities).
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Under North Carolina law, any form of gambling—save for state sanc-
tioned lotteries or gambling that takes place at one of the state’s two Indian
casinos—is illegal.6 From video poker to slot machines and faro tables, there
are only a handful of exceptions under which games of chance or luck may
legally be played or operated within the state of North Carolina. While this
might seem like one of the few clearly explicated laws on the state’s books,
North Carolina has seen much legal ambiguity rise out of its attempts to control
the rapid proliferation of video poker and sweepstakes parlors that continually
open and operate in strip malls throughout the state.7
While there have been several attempts by the state legislature to outlaw
all types of electronic gambling within state lines, each attempt is marked by
legal challenges and product evolution ensuring that the implementation of
each new statute is either delayed by pending litigation or is inapplicable to
new gaming technology. The most recent and contentious of these battles has
surrounded sweepstakes parlors: gambling parlors that originally opened due to
loopholes in a 2007 state statute that outlawed video poker.8 Featuring “vivid
graphics [that] often resemble slot machines or card games,”9 these quasi-
Internet cafes have morphed, in response to subsequent legislative attempts to
close the industry, into parlors where customers buy long-distance telephone
cards or time on computers that have pre-installed gaming software.10 After
purchasing pre-paid phone cards or time on the computer, customers receive
“entries” to play a variety of luck or skill-based games.11 However, to circum-
vent anti-gambling legislation, the parlor randomly predetermines the outcomes
of these games before the customer buys the product and receives his or her
entries, allowing the parlor to claim that it is running a sweepstakes, which
does not involve gambling.12 Although parlor owners allege that such activity
is not gambling, every appellate court that has considered the issue has found
otherwise, focusing on the concept that customers exchange money, even if
indirectly, for the chance to possibly win a prize.13 These “convenience casi-
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-292 (2014); see also Pamela M. Prah, States Battle Illegal Gam-
bling at Internet Cafes, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/03/24/stateline-illegal-gambling-internet-cafes/6829731/.
7 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-304, 295–96, 294 (2014); see also Letter to Sen. Soles, Op.
N.C. Att’y Gen., N. C. Dep’t of Justice, available at http://www.ncdoj.gov/About-DOJ/
Legal-Services/Legal-Opinions/Opinions/Video-Games-or-Video-Poker-Machines.aspx
(June 7, 2000) (advising Senator Soles that the applicable anti-video poker statutes prohibit
the storing or warehousing of video poker machines). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18C (2014)
(providing exceptions to the general prohibition on gambling in North Carolina).
8 Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., Lights Out at Most Gaming Parlors - Sunday Was Deadline to
Comply with Latest Court Ruling or Close Shop, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 2, 2013, at
1B.
9 Id. 
10 Id.; see also Internet Sweepstakes Cages, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangam-
ing.org/government-affairs/priority-issues/internet-sweepstakes-cafes (last visited March 2,
2015) (explaining the concept of sweepstakes cafes).
11 Wootson, supra note 8.
12 Internet Sweepstakes Cages, supra note 10.
13 See, e.g., Telesweeps of Butler Valley, Inc. v. Kelly, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146157, No.
3:12-CV-1374, at *29 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2012) (“Plaintiffs attempt to separate the consider-
ation from the chance to win by inserting a step between the two elements is clever, but it
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nos” have created legal ambiguities in almost every state where they operate,
including North Carolina, forcing legislatures and judges to draw often imme-
diately anachronistic legal distinctions that are quickly skirted by new techno-
logical developments.14
These sweepstakes parlors invite suspicion from public figures, including
sheriffs, state legislators, and federal authorities all of whom fear that the par-
lors violate gambling regulations, fail to properly account for their income, and
harm the communities in which they are located.15 The situation in North Caro-
lina has been particularly demonstrative of the difficult public policy, legal, and
economic concerns that states, municipalities, and law enforcement officials
face when deciding how best to control the industry.16
The second part of this article will explain the complex legal and procedu-
ral background of sweepstakes law in North Carolina, particularly by focusing
on the state’s recent legislative restrictions on gaming, and relevant case law. It
will also address the changes the sweepstakes industry has made in its effort to
place parlor activities outside the purview of the state regulations. Because this
article contends that the regulation of unlawful sweepstakes parlors should be
the responsibility of local communities, the third and final part of this article
will explore the different legal mechanisms that municipalities throughout the
state have employed or can employ to try and regulate an industry that has
successfully avoided state-wide efforts at regulation in the past.
II. SWEEPSTAKES LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
For the past decade, the North Carolina legislature has attempted to curb
the widespread proliferation of gambling parlors that continue to open and
operate in the state. As a result of these efforts, the legislature, state regulators,
and those who operate sweepstakes parlors have engaged in a continuing cat
and mouse game, each trying to stay ahead of the other. This process began in
2006 when the North Carolina General Assembly passed a bill that outlawed
video gambling, including a prohibition on the operation of video poker
merely elevates form over substance. At bottom, what Telesweeps is doing constitutes
gambling”).
14 Steve Silver, The Curious Case of Convenience Casinos: How Internet Sweepstakes
Cafes Survive in a Gray Area Between Unlawful Gaming and Legitimate Business Promo-
tions, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593, 595 (2012) (introducing the term
‘convenience casino’ and discussing the difficulty state legislatures and judges have had with
regulating them and interpreting said regulations).
15 See Felix Gillette, The Casino Next Door, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_18/b4226076180073.htm (noting the
various concerns that authorities have had surrounding the recent, but widespread prolifera-
tion of sweepstakes parlors).
16 See, e.g., Sharon McBrayer, Sweepstakes Swept Out: N.C. Supreme Court Says Games
Illegal, HICKORY DAILY REC. ONLINE (Dec. 17, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://www.hickoryrecord
.com/article_058234c2-4648-11e2-aca7-0019bb30f31a.html (noting, among other things, the
widespread economic impact that closing the state’s 1,000-1,500 sweepstakes parlors would
have on their 15,000 employees and the communities in which they operate).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\5-2\NVG202.txt unknown Seq: 4  3-JUN-15 15:12
164 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:161
machines.17 However, game parlor operators quickly implemented new steps to
skirt this blanket prohibition, by opening up electronic gaming shops where
entrants could use computers and not “lever-pulling poker machines.”18 This
noticeable difference, game parlor operators argued, meant that they were com-
plying with the statute.19
Exploiting this legal ambiguity, many video poker parlors quickly became
sweepstakes parlors whose owners argued that their customers paid for Internet
time on servers, not the games themselves, and because the games’ prizes were
predetermined, the sweepstakes fell outside the purview of the 2006 video
poker legislation.20 In response to these industry changes, the state legislature,
in 2010, again attempted to enact a broad ban on electronic gaming and video
gambling by prohibiting the possession of terminals that either mimic slot
machines without the levers, or that conduct sweepstakes-type games.21
Despite numerous attempts by the legislature to ensure the industry’s death, by
2012, the video-sweepstakes industry in North Carolina had grown to an indus-
try worth approximately $1 billion annually.22
A. Legislative Efforts to Eliminate Sweepstakes Gaming
To counter the rapid changes that sweepstakes industry professionals were
making to keep their games outside the purview of state regulation, the legisla-
ture passed a comprehensive video gaming ban in 2010, which specifically
targeted sweepstakes operations.23 The focal point of anti-sweepstakes regula-
tion in North Carolina is embodied in § 14-306.4 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, which specifically outlaws the use of any electronic machine or device
that is owned or leased by a promoter, is used by an entrant, and that “uses
energy, and that is capable of displaying information on a screen or other mech-
anism.”24 The text of the legislation is broad in nature, creating a blanket prohi-
bition on the use of such machines and specifically noting that the law prohibits
17 Parker Dozier, Video Sweepstakes Try to Stay Ahead of the North Carolina Legislature,
CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER (Mar. 10, 2013), http://campbelllawobserver.com/video-sweep
stakes-try-to-stay-ahead-of-the-north-carolina-legislature/.
18 Emily Weaver, Seven Years Later, Sweepstakes Battles Continue, BLUE RIDGE TIMES-
NEWS (June 30, 2013, 4:30 AM), http://www.blueridgenow.com/article/20130630/
ARTICLES/130629779.
19 See id.
20 Caroline Denning & Douglas L. Yearwood, Internet Sweepstakes Cafes: A Survey of Law
Enforcement Perceptions, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY GOVERNOR’S CRIME COMM’N, 4
(Oct. 2010), available at https://www.ncdps.gov/div/gcc/pdfs/internet_cafe.pdf (explicating
the arguments for legality made by sweepstakes advocates after the 2006 anti-video poker
legislation was passed).
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-306.4 (2014).
22 Mark Binker, Court Upholds Law Banning Video Sweepstakes Gambling, WRAL.COM
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.wral.com/court-upholds-law-on-video-sweepstakes-gambling/
11877821.
23 Wesley Ryan Shelley, End of the Chase: Using North Carolina as a Guide for Ending
Other States’ Video Sweepstakes Legislative Merry-Go-Round in the Wake of Hest Technol-
ogies v. North Carolina, 36 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 41, 49 (2013) (noting that the 2010 legisla-
tion passed by the state was an attempt to close the loopholes left in the 2007 bill that
sweepstakes parlors exploited).
24 § 14-306.4(a)(1).
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their use even if sweepstakes operators attempt to employ commonly used
exceptions to sweepstake rules.25 Later sections of the statute have formed the
basis for part of the legal ambiguity of the law, stating that it is unlawful to
operate an electronic machine or device to either conduct or promote a sweep-
stakes through use of an entertaining display, including the entry process or the
reveal of a prize.26 However, the legislature seemed to account for the possibil-
ity of technological development by inserting a catch-all provision in the statute
that states: “It is the intent of this section to prohibit any mechanism that seeks
to avoid application of this section through the use of any subterfuge or pre-
tense whatsoever.”27
Although the legislature clearly intended this portion of the statute to cure
the legal ambiguity relied on by sweepstakes parlors, there has been little judi-
cial notice of the efficacy of such a provision. Even with the seemingly pre-
scient catchall text of the statute, the judiciary has not universally accepted
anti-sweepstakes legislation in North Carolina. In fact, it went through a fairly
rocky period of judicial review after its passage.28
B. Judicial Override, then Acceptance of Anti-Sweepstakes Legislation
1. Initial Judicial Reluctance to Uphold Legislative Ban on
Sweepstakes
In Hest Techs., Inc. v. State of N.C. ex rel. Perdue (“Hest Techs I”), the
North Carolina Court of Appeals heard legal challenges raised by two compa-
nies that operated Internet cafes in North Carolina.29 The companies sold high-
speed Internet access and long-distance telephone time, and developed sweep-
stakes software as a method to promote the sales of other products in their
Internet cafes.30 According to the court, when entrants purchased Internet
access or long-distance phone time, they received sweepstakes entries, or alter-
natively, could fill out forms to get free entries; the sweepstakes software had
predetermined the result of each entry.31 The software then allowed the contest-
ant to choose to either have the predetermined outcome “pre-revealed” or have
it displayed after the game was played, although neither option changed the
predetermined outcome of the sweepstakes.32 Regardless of the outcome of a
particular entry, the customer was able to retain the benefit of the purchased
Internet time or phone.33 In defense of the sweepstakes, plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of section 14-306.4, alleging that it was both an unconsti-
25 § 14-306.4(a)(1)(a)–(n).
26 § 14-306.4(b).
27 § 14-306.4(c); see also Shelley, supra note 23, at 49.
28 The North Carolina Court of Appeals originally overturned the seminal piece of anti-
sweepstakes legislation in Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 725 S.E.2d 10 (N.C.
2012). However, later that year, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled the Court of
Appeals, finding the statute a constitutional regulation of gambling. Hest Techs., Inc. v. State
ex rel. Perdue, 749 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. 2012).
29 725 S.E.2d at 11–12.
30 Id. at 11 (noting that the proprietary sweepstakes software developed by the plaintiffs was
done as a means of “marketing their products at the point of sale”).
31 Id. at 11–12.
32 Id. at 12.
33 Id. 
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tutional restriction of speech and overbroad.34 The Court of Appeals agreed
with the plaintiffs and struck the statute down.35
The appellate court focused on two important legal theories: (1) that the
regulation was an infringement on sweepstakes owners’ First Amendment
rights; and (2) that the regulation was facially overbroad.36 Although the
defendants attempted to argue that the statute regulated conduct and not speech,
the Court of Appeals held that the statute’s regulation of the “dissemination of
sweepstakes results through entertaining displays cannot be characterized as
merely a regulation of conduct . . . [the] portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-306.4
which forbids the ‘reveal of a prize’ by means of an entertaining display
directly regulates protected speech under the First Amendment.”37 Following
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions extending First Amendment pro-
tections to video games, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
statutory prohibition on the conveyance of sweepstakes results through “an
entertaining display,” as opposed to another medium such as words on a screen,
scratch off ticket, or verbal acknowledgement, warranted First Amendment
scrutiny.38 Additionally, the Court of Appeals found the statute to be unconsti-
tutionally overbroad, noting that the prohibition created by the statute “nearly
encompasses all forms of video games, from the simplest simulation to a much
more complex game requiring substantial amounts of interactive gameplay by
the player, and thus, operates as a categorical ban on all video games for the
purposes of communicating a sweepstakes result.”39
The Court of Appeals’ determination that First Amendment protections
apply to sweepstakes is at odds with the conclusions that other state and federal
courts have arrived at when considering similar legislative prohibitions on
sweepstakes. For example, in Crisante v. Coats, a federal court in Florida sur-
veyed cases in which challengers of state sweepstakes laws raised First Amend-
ment defenses, and found that numerous courts agree that anti-sweepstakes
regulations affect conduct, not speech, and are thus not eligible for First
Amendment protections.40 The United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
34 Id. (noting that after the July 2010 amendment of House Bill 80, which outlawed the use
of entertaining displays by sweepstakes operators, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to
include arguments that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-306.4 was “an unconstitutional regulation of
plaintiffs’ protected First Amendment speech”).
35 While this Court has recognized, and we agree, that “[i]t is the legislature’s preroga-
tive to establish the conditions under which bingo, lotteries, or other games of chance
are to be permitted,” the portion of [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-306.4] in the instant case
regulates solely how a sweepstakes result is communicated, rather than the underly-
ing circumstances under which the sweepstakes are permitted. . . . N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-306.1 is unconstitutionally overbroad in these circumstances and must be
declared void.
Id. at 14–15 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
36 Id. at 12–13.
37 Id. at 13.
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 14–15.
40 No. 8:11-CV-2007-T-17TBM, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53646, at *33–34 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
17, 2012) (noting that in Allied Veterans of the World, Inc.: Affiliate 67 v. Seminole Cnty.,
783 F.Supp.2d 1197 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d 468 F. App’x 922 (11th Cir. 2012), the district
and federal appellate courts had rejected the argument that local sweepstakes ordinances
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trict of Pennsylvania also found that a state statute proscribing phone cards for
sweepstakes entries was a regulation of conduct rather than speech, and was
thus subject to rational basis review, not the strict scrutiny required when First
Amendment protections are triggered.41 The Superior Court of Massachusetts
reached the same conclusion when it considered whether anti-sweepstakes stat-
utes merited First Amendment protection.42 In upholding the anti-sweepstakes
statute, that court found that regulating of the use of entertaining displays was
not a regulation of expression per se, because it was the “expression as an
incidental part of the conduct of a game of chance that [was] banned.”43
2. The North Carolina Supreme Court Weighs In
Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in favor of sweep-
stakes operators and promoters, its decision brought the industry only eight
months of hassle-free operation before the state Supreme Court changed
course. In Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Purdue (“Hest Techs II”), the North
Carolina Supreme Court joined the prior-mentioned courts and held that N.C.
Gen. Stat. section 14-306.4 regulated non-communicative conduct, not pro-
tected speech.44 For the Supreme Court, the statute’s constitutionality rests on
what the statute actually prohibits: the operation of machines for the purpose of
conducting sweepstakes by using entertaining displays.45 To the Court, a prohi-
bition on operation of a machine is a prohibition on conduct, not speech.46
However, this determination was not the end of the Court’s inquiry, it subse-
quently held that in certain situations, conduct can trigger First Amendment
protections just as traditional speech can.47
The Court, in searching for supportive case law, relied on There to Care,
Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Revenue, a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
case that determined that the speech involved in a game of bingo did not war-
rant First Amendment protection.48 According to the North Carolina Supreme
regulated speech and denied them First Amendment protections because, per the courts’
reasoning, the ordinance at issue outlawed the conduct of paying a prize after the use of a
game device, not the speech underlying the sweepstakes itself).
41 Telesweeps of Butler Valley, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 3:12-CV-1374, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146157, at *33–34 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2012) (“In sum, Act 81 regulates conduct and not
speech. As such, Act 81 need only bear a rational relation to its legitimate interest in regulat-
ing gambling, and the Court is satisfied that [it does].”).
42 See City Cyber Cafe´, LLC v. Coakley, No. SUCV2012-04194-BLS1, 2012 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 346, at *1, 22–23 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2012) (denying plaintiff’s request for
preliminary injunction on the grounds that Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 271, § 5B (2012) was a
constitutional regulation of conduct).
43 Id. at *20.
44 366 N.C. 289, 296 (2012).
45 Id.
46 Id. (“[T]he act of running a sweepstakes is conduct rather than speech, despite the fact
that sweepstakes participants must be informed whether they have won or lost. ‘It has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language.’” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
47 Id. at 297.
48 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[The] words do not convey ideas; any other combi-
nation of letters and numbers would serve the purpose equally well. They employ vocal
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Court, telling sweepstakes entrants that they won or lost was analogous to
shouting “Bingo!”49 Therefore, the Court was able to distinguish the case at
hand from cases that the appellant had argued applied, effectively denying the
First Amendment protections that the North Carolina Court of Appeals had so
readily embraced. In effect, this decision reconciled North Carolina law with
the law of other jurisdictions that had considered the issue both before and after
the Court of Appeals decided Hest I.
By foreclosing the possibility of First Amendment protection and holding
that the statute was not overbroad, the Court gave the North Carolina Legisla-
ture’s seminal anti-sweepstakes legislation constitutional approval for regula-
tory implementation.50 However, the gaming industry, traditionally marked by
ingenuity, did not sit idly by after the decision in Hest Techs II.51 In fact,
sweepstakes operators have subsequently implemented two primary methodol-
ogies to subvert the (now) constitutional anti-sweepstakes statute and evade
prosecution, or at least, to muddy the regulatory waters: (1) using pre-reveal
systems; and (2) transitioning to games of skill.52 Potential legal challenges are
sure to await these new alternatives to the traditional sweepstakes model, and
the catchall clause inserted into the statute by the Legislature could become the
basis for future civil and criminal actions against sweepstakes operators.53
3. Clarity or Confusion: Do Recent Preliminary Injunctions Signal a
Reversal in Judicial Interpretation of North Carolina’s Gaming
Law?
Although the battery of litigation surrounding the 2010 legislation seems
to have ended the debate on the state’s authority to enforce the statute, a recent
pre-trial decision from a state trial court—affirmed on interlocutory appeal—
again casts doubt on the state’s ability to enforce anti-sweepstakes legislation.54
In Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Sheriff of Onslow Co., Sandhill and Gift Sur-
plus, operators of sweepstakes parlors in Onslow County, North Carolina, filed
for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sheriff’s department from closing
their operations and seizing their video kiosks.55 This dispute arose when
officers from the Alcohol Law Enforcement and Sheriff’s Department investi-
cords but are no more ‘expression’ than are such statements as ‘21’ in a game of blackjack or
‘three peaches!’ by someone who has just pulled the handle of a one-armed bandit.”).
49 Hest Techs II, 366 N.C. at 300.
50 Id. at 302–33 (denying First Amendment protection to sweepstakes owners seeking pro-
tection from state statute prohibiting the operation of sweepstakes).
51 See Dan Way, Court Ban has not Ended Sweepstakes Operations, CAROLINA J. ONLINE
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=9870
(noting that sweepstakes operators began to change their software to elude the anti-sweep-
stakes statute Hest Techs II upheld).
52 Jeff Welty, Sweepstakes Update, N.C. CRIM. L. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://nc
criminallaw.sog.unc.edu/sweepstakes-update.
53 See id.
54 See Michael D. Abernethy, Internet Sweepstakes Businesses Opening Again, TIMES-
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2014, 9:02 PM), http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/top-news/internet-
sweepstakes-businesses-opening-again-1.261496 (noting that a recent decision determined
that software changes made the sweepstakes machines “promotional device[s],” and there-
fore legal.).
55 762 S.E.2d 666, 670-71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
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gated Sandhill after receiving complaints that it was operating video kiosks that
paid out money winnings after patrons played games, in violation of the 2010
anti-sweepstakes legislation.56 The appellate panel described with accuracy the
type of video kiosk that was at issue:
The kiosks each include a 19” touch-screen display, an audio speaker, a
control panel with “print ticket and play buttons,” a receipt printer, and
a currency acceptor. The kiosks allow patrons the opportunity to
purchase gift certificates that may be used at Gift Surplus’s online store,
www.gift-surplus.com. When a patron inserts currency into the kiosk, a
receipt is printed with equivalent credits ($1 is equivalent to 100 sweep-
stakes entries). The receipts printed also contain a “quick response
code,” which users may scan to enter a weekly drawing on the Gift
Surplus website. Patrons may also use the kiosk to request a free entry
request code, which allows for 100 free sweepstakes entries.57
A gaming expert testified that the sweepstakes games the patrons played
with the given codes were the traditional “pre-reveal variety” and the “animate/
play” variety, both of which require the patron to use skill in that they must
nudge the play wheel in the correct direction in order to win the prize.58
What is especially interesting about this case is the level of legal protec-
tion that the trial court afforded the sweepstakes parlors in granting the prelimi-
nary injunction. In the order, the trial court, concluded as a matter of law that
“[t]he Gift Surplus System v1-01.1 and the Gift Surplus computer kiosk pro-
mote the sale of products through a lawful sweepstakes under North Carolina
law.”59 The implications and inferential conclusions of this statement were that
the trial court—either accidentally or purposefully—declared that the plain-
tiffs’ businesses and similar operations were legal under North Carolina law,
and therefore the Sheriff had no authority to prosecute.60
The appellate panel, after hearing the Sheriff’s appeal, recognized the
potential effects of this definite and legally binding language, particularly the
potential for the trial court’s finding to delay the prosecution of all sweepstakes
parlors throughout the state.61 Fearing the potential wide-spread implications of
the trial court’s overreach, the appellate panel struck the legally determinative
language from the preliminary injunction, and instead issued an order that
merely upheld the status quo by protecting only Sandhill’s video kiosks from
prosecution until the pending litigation provided a final outcome.62
56 Id. at 669.
57 Id. at 670.
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 676.
60 Id. 
61 Id. (“[T]his conclusion of law makes a declaration concerning the lawfulness of these
kiosks and would cast doubt upon every prosecution by the State throughout North Caro-
lina.” (internal quotation omitted)).
62 Id. (“As these portions of the preliminary injunction go beyond maintaining the status
quo by declaring that Plaintiffs’ conduct was lawful or valid, these portions affect Sheriff
Brown’s substantial right to enforce the laws of North Carolina. Thus, we exercise jurisdic-
tion for the limited purpose of vacating the sixth conclusion of law in its entirety and striking
the word ‘validly’ from the third item in the decretal section of the preliminary injunction.”
(emphasis in original)).
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Thus, the question for legal scholars (and sweepstakes owners) is whether
the trial court’s decision and the appellate court’s review of Sandhill’s prelimi-
nary injunction signals another shift in North Carolina’s sweepstakes law.
While the trial court’s conclusory statements of law may demonstrate a judicial
reluctance (at least at the local level) to strictly interpret and apply N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 14-306.4, the appellate panel’s decision is even less clear. While
the decision to strike the trial court’s conclusory statement of law may have
stemmed from the appellate panel’s interpretation of the underlying gaming
law, it may have also been merely to preserve the overarching principle behind
preliminary injunctions, from which the trial court had strayed.63 Until the
issue is tried and the full appellate court issues a statement of law that has
finality, the only fundamental principle of gaming law that the Sandhill deci-
sion promulgates is that the North Carolina sweepstakes industry is again able
to transform their software and operations quickly enough to stifle statewide
regulation based on already anachronistic statutes.
III. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AS A SOURCE OF REGULATORY CONTROL
Although the legal battle between regulators and gaming parlor operators
has created a host of legal ambiguities surrounding North Carolina gaming law,
there is one clear trend that has emerged: statewide gaming laws have failed
and will continue to fail to outlaw gaming parlors. There is simply too much
incentive and creativity on the part of gaming parlor operators, who consist-
ently modify software, consoles, and games, for the state to ever be able to
create an effective comprehensive ban on parlor gambling.64 Instead of a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme that requires constant legislative updates and tre-
mendous financial and resource commitment for enforcement, the primary
arrow in the state’s regulatory quiver should be municipal ordinances. In recent
years, municipalities throughout North Carolina have attempted to create what
this article will refer to as “soft prohibitions” on gaming within the municipal
legislature’s limits, namely by using its power of taxation as a regulatory
enforcement mechanism.65
A. Local Taxes as an Enforcement Mechanism
For a state whose name is not synonymous with gambling, North Carolina
has a body of case law that, although small, is surprisingly well developed on
the taxation of gambling activities.66 Municipal legislative attempts to tax gam-
ing—or more specifically, to tax sweepstakes parlors—have forced North Car-
olina’s courts to consider the constitutional limits of taxation several times.67
63 See, e.g., A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 759 (N.C. 1983); State ex
rel. Edmisten v. Fayetteville St. Christian Sch., 261 S.E.2d 908, 913 (N.C. 1980) (“The
purpose of a preliminary injunction is ordinarily to preserve the status quo pending trial on
the merits.”).
64 See supra Part II.
65 See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
66 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fayetteville, 743 S.E.2d 662, 663 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); IMT,
Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 738 S.E.2d 156 (N.C. 2013).
67 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.a–b.
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Predictably, in their efforts to limit gaming, municipalities have levied higher
than usual privilege license fees against electronic gaming operations.68 Own-
ers of gaming parlors have challenged these quasi-regulatory actions as uncon-
stitutional, forcing the courts to provide in-depth legal analyses of the
constitutionality of taxes as applied to gambling activities. Throughout these
legal opinions, North Carolina appellate courts have employed the doctrine of
the “Just and Equitable Tax Clause,” found in North Carolina’s Constitution.69
This section will discuss the two unique and distinct sub-sections of this consti-
tutional clause; the first requires that “the power of taxation shall be exercised
in a just and equitable manner,” while the second part necessitates that this
taxation power may be exercised “for public purposes only.”70
1. “In a Just and Equitable Manner”
a. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton71
In 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court had its first opportunity to
clarify the legal implications of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause when an
Internet cafe´/gaming parlor in Lumberton, North Carolina challenged the city’s
new privilege license fee increase for electronic gaming operations.72 Pursuant
to a state law allowing municipalities to levy privilege licenses for the carrying
on of a business,73 the City of Lumberton drastically increased the licensing fee
for businesses that allowed “persons [to] utilize electronic machines . . . to
conduct games of chance, including . . . sweepstakes.”74 The fee was raised
from a flat fee of $12.50 per year to $5,000 for each business location, plus an
additional $2,500 for each computer terminal operated at the location—essen-
tially creating a new minimum tax of $7,500 per location and raising the effec-
tive tax rate for such businesses 59,900%.75 The four plaintiff Internet cafes
challenged the constitutionality of the statute; however, the Court of Appeals
held for the appellees on the grounds that the appellants failed to proffer evi-
dence that the tax was prohibitive on their particular businesses.76
The North Carolina Supreme Court began its analysis in IMT with an
abbreviated discussion of the prior judicial history surrounding article V, sec-
tion 2 of the North Carolina Constitution.77 Dividing the judicial history of the
68 Dan Way, Cities Using Hefty Tax Rates to Discourage Internet Sweepstakes, CAROLINA
J. ONLINE (Jul. 24, 2012), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html
?id=9325 (noting that municipalities in North Carolina, fearing the potentially negative
impact of the proliferation of sweepstakes parlors within their city limits, have used
increased privilege license fees to discourage internet cafes/sweepstakes parlors from
opening).
69 N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2.
70 Id.
71 738 S.E.2d 156 (N.C. 2013).
72 Id. at 157 (“The question before this Court is whether the City of Lumberton’s privilege
license tax violates the Just and Equitable Tax Clause of Article V, Section 2(1) of the North
Carolina Constitution.”).
73 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-109(e) (2007).
74 IMT, 738 S.E.2d at 157.
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 158.
77 Id.
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section into three parts, the court noted that it had already interpreted the Public
Purpose Clause and the Contracting Away Clause, but had not yet issued a
definitive interpretation of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause.78 The court was
quick to delineate the importance of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause, noting
that it—like the entire article of the constitution—functions as a limiting provi-
sion on the exercise of government power, and thus cannot be treated as “mere
precatory language.”79
After establishing its importance in a full legal analysis of the clause’s
substance, it became immediately clear that the patchwork and often indirect
treatment of the clause by prior courts had left the state Supreme Court with no
definitive framework for its analysis.80 To remedy this lack of legal framework,
the Court adopted the framework established by a 1947 case, Nesbitt v. Gill, in
which the Court analyzed the effect of a tax on the purchase of horses and
mules.81 In Nesbitt, the Court predominantly considered whether the tax had
been uniformly applied,82 but also considered factors such as the population of
the city or town, the gross and aggregate sales of the good, and any available
alternative taxes.83 However, the Supreme Court did not consider the Nesbitt
factors to be binding or exhaustive.84 Instead, it also considered the absolute
size of the tax increase, along with the disparity between the amount of tax
levied against electronic gaming establishments and other businesses, ulti-
mately concluding that the tax violated article V, § 2 of the North Carolina
Constitution.85
b. Later Cases
In the wake of the IMT decision, the assertion that higher privilege taxes
for electronic gaming operations are unconstitutional under the Just and Equita-
ble Tax Clause may become the basis for more legal challenges against munici-
pal ordinances designed to regulate the video sweepstakes industry.86 For
78 Id. (“In the past, we have construed two of the three limitations enumerated [in N.C.
Const. art. V, § 2(1)]. The Public Purpose Clause limits the State’s ability to use tax revenue
for private enterprises. . . . Similarly, the Contracting Away Clause limits the State’s ability
to delegate its taxing power. . . . The Just and Equitable Tax Clause, however, has avoided a
similarly thorough analysis.”).
79 Id. (noting that failure to treat the Just and Equitable Clause as a substantive limit on the
power of taxation would “create internal inconsistency within [N.C. Const. art 5, § 2].” Id.).
80 See id. at 159.
81 41 S.E.2d 646 (N.C. 1947).
82 Id. at 650 (“The General Assembly is not restricted to uniformity as between trades or
professions in levying a privilege or license tax. However, the tax must apply equally to all
persons belonging to the prescribed class upon which it is imposed.”).
83 Id. 
84 IMT, 738 S.E.2d at 160 (“In cases arising under the Just and Equitable Tax Clause, trial
courts should look to Nesbitt for guiding factors in assessing such claims. But those factors
should not be viewed as exhaustive.”)
85 Id. (“[W]e conclude the companies here have shown that the present tax . . . constituted
an abuse of the City’s tax-levying discretion.”)
86 See Chris McLaughlin, NC Supreme Court Strikes Down Lumberton’s Tax on Video
Sweepstakes, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T COATES’ CANONS: NC LOC. GOV’T. L. BLOG (Mar. 14,
2013), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=7037 (“[C]ities that levy privilege license taxes on
video sweepstakes at rates similar to those levied by Lumberton ($5,000 per location, $2,500
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example, in Smith v. City of Fayetteville, a gaming parlor owner challenged a
2010 ordinance passed by the City of Fayetteville that raised the privilege
license for electronic gaming operations from a flat tax of $50.00 per year to a
rate of $2,000 per location, plus $2,500 per computer terminal.87 However, for
the purposes of deciding the case, the court determined the minimum tax
increase on each sweepstakes parlor was 8,900%.88 Even the comparatively
lower tax increase could not save the municipality’s privilege license fee
increase, however, as the court held that the ordinance “violates the Just and
Equitable Tax Clause for the [same] reasons stated in IMT.”89
Unfortunately, the 2013 Court of Appeals decision did not further elabo-
rate on the Nesbitt balancing test, or conduct its own analysis of why an
8,900% increase was so analogous to the 59,000% increase in IMT as to not
warrant independent consideration of its reasonableness.90 Instead, the Court of
Appeals in Smith appeared content to accept a “gut check test” as to the rate
increase’s reasonableness or non-reasonableness.91 Arguably, therefore, if a tax
increase forces a reasonable person to cringe, it violates the Just and Equitable
Tax Clause.
2. “For Public Purposes Only”
The second part of North Carolina’s Just and Equitable Tax Clause
requires that the power of taxation be exercised “for public purposes only.”92
Although the public purposes doctrine guides the exercise of governmental tax
policies, it has often been muddied by jurisprudence that conflates it with the
similarly named but distinct doctrine of public use.93 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina attempted to distinguish the two doctrines in Piedmont Triad
Airport Auth. v. Urbine, in which the defendant/appellant challenged the exer-
cise of eminent domain, on the grounds that there was no public purpose for the
airport authority to constitutionally condemn and seize his land.94 The North
Carolina Supreme Court immediately entered into a discussion about the dis-
tinction between the public use requirement that underlies the doctrine of emi-
per machine) are now on notice that those taxes might be held unconstitutional if they are
challenged in court.”).
87 743 S.E.2d 662, 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
88 Id. (noting that, although the minimum tax increase for a business with one terminal
would be 8,900%, most businesses operated multiple terminals. For example, the Smith
plaintiff’s business had 12 computer terminals and was therefore “taxed $32,000 under the
new ordinance—almost a 64,000% increase from the previous $50 tax.” Id.).
89 Id. (“[T]he city’s 8,900% ‘minimum tax increase is wholly detached from the moorings
of anything reasonably resembling a just an equitable tax.’” (quoting IMT, 738 S.E.2d at
160.)).
90 Id. 
91 See generally id. (declining to further elaborate on evaluation methodology, and appear-
ing to rely on the shock-value of the rate increase numbers alone to determine whether a tax
violates the Just and Equitable Clause).
92 N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
93 See, e.g., Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d 331, 332 (N.C. 2001);
Charlotte v. Heath, 40 S.E.2d 600, 604 (N.C. 1946).
94 Piedmont, 554 S.E.2d at 332.
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nent domain and the public purpose requirement that underlies the state
constitution’s Just and Equitable Tax Clause.95
Generally, if it is the public purpose requirement at issue, North Carolina
courts construe the term “public purpose” broadly. For example, the State
Supreme Court has said that, “a tax or an appropriation is certainly for a public
purpose if it is for the support of government, or for any of the recognized
objects of government.”96 According to the court, this requires only a “reasona-
ble connection with the convenience and necessity of the particular municipal-
ity” and allows for taxation where the tax will be exercised for the “benefit,
welfare, and protection” of a municipality’s inhabitants.97
So what exactly is the connection, if any, between gaming—particularly
sweepstakes parlors—and the public purpose doctrine of state taxation? Simply
put, this article contends that courts should view article V, section 2 of the
North Carolina Constitution as a balancing test when evaluating the constitu-
tionality of a particular tax or expenditure. The significance of the public pur-
pose for the tax should be viewed as inversely proportional to how just and
equitable the suggested tax would be. This would accomplish the dual objec-
tives of the State Judiciary and the opponents of sweepstakes gaming parlors
because the balancing test precludes carte blanche imposition of unjust tax
rates,98 while giving municipalities the flexibility to accommodate pressing
public concerns through their tax and spend powers.99 As presently construed,
however, the Just and Equitable Clause would override its companion Public
Purpose Clause in any judicial challenge, essentially handcuffing any munici-
pality’s use of its taxation power to regulate for the public welfare.
3. Would Another Interpretation of Article V Alleviate Concerns of
Unjust Taxation while Preserving Municipalities’ Power in
Protecting Its Citizens?
Although state courts are rightfully concerned about the dangerous poten-
tial of a legislative body’s unchecked power to tax, a different interpretation of
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause by the court could give municipalities the
power to regulate gaming and simultaneously protect business enterprises from
unjust taxation. In its seminal IMT decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court
pressed the concept of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a powerful limita-
tion on the State’s power to tax, as evidenced by its prominent placement in the
95 Id. (“There remains a distinction between the terms ‘public purpose’ and ‘public use.’
Although the analysis in determining both is often similar, the term ‘public purpose’ pertains
to governmental expenditures of tax monies, while the term ‘public use’ pertains to the
exercise of eminent domain.”).
96 Green v. Kitchin, 50 S.E.2d 545, 549 (N.C. 1948).
97 Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 36 S.E.2d 803, 809 (N.C. 1946). See
also Morgan v. Town of Spindale, 118 S.E.2d 913, 914 (N.C. 1961).
98 See State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 679 (N.C. 1982) (noting that a balancing test counters
unquestioned approval of the exercise of police powers).
99 See In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 785 (N.C. 2003) (explaining that one of the principal
benefits of employing balancing tests is that they “provide trial courts with the flexibility to
respond to unique circumstances and unanticipated situations,” while “bright-line rules . . .
limit future judicial discretion. . . .”).
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State Constitution.100 However, the IMT court interprets the clause in precisely
the way it sought not to. By treating the three clauses of the constitutional
article’s section as independent legal principles and evaluating each outside the
context of the other, it deliberately omitted words chosen by the people to be
placed in the State Constitution. More importantly, in IMT, the North Carolina
Supreme Court departed from long held tenants of North Carolina constitu-
tional interpretation. Previous cases adopting rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion for later courts to follow demanded that, “greater regard is to be given to
the dominant purpose than to the use of any particular words.”101 In fact, North
Carolina courts are supposed to rely on “the history of the questioned provision
and its antecedents, the conditions that existed prior to its enactment, and the
purposes sought to be accomplished by its promulgation.”102 Additionally, the
IMT court’s interpretation of the Just and Equitable Clause violated another
canon of state constitutional interpretation, namely that:
In searching for the will and intent of the people as expressed in the
Constitution, all cognate provisions are to be brought into view in their
entirety and so interpreted as to effectuate the manifest purposes of the
instrument. The best way to ascertain the meaning of a word or sentence
in the Constitution is to read it contextually and to compare it with other
words and sentences with which it stands connected.103
In IMT, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether the
increased cost of the city’s privilege license violated the Constitution’s Just and
Equitable Tax Clause, not whether it violated the section of the constitutional
article as a whole. The IMT court’s opinion effectively severed the Just and
Equitable Clause from the remaining Contracting Clause and Public Purpose
Clause instead of reading one in light of the others. Given that the clauses are
all interconnected parts of the same section in the same article, the court appar-
ently deviated from its previously espoused principles of constitutional
interpretation.
Had the court correctly interpreted the constitutional clause at issue in
IMT, it could have both protected citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable tax-
ation and simultaneously allowed municipalities to use the tax code as a regula-
tory mechanism. A balancing test between two competing clauses could have
crafted a more comprehensive vision of limitations on the government’s taxing
and spending power by viewing the Just and Equitable Clause in conjunction
with the Public Purpose Clause, as indicated by the comma separating the
neighboring clauses in the section.104 This would have enabled the court to
conduct an inversely proportional analysis where a stronger public purpose
would yield a lower reasonableness factor imposed by the Just and Equitable
100 IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 738 S.E.2d 156, 158 (N.C. 2013) (“The people of North
Carolina placed the Just and Equitable Tax Clause in their Constitution, and we are not at
liberty to selectively dismiss its relevance.”).
101 Perry v. Stancil, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (N.C. 1953) (citations omitted).
102 Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 110 (N.C. 1980).
103 Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 410 (N.C. 2002) (quoting State v. Emery, 31
S.E.2d 858, 860 (N.C. 1944) (citations omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) (“The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and
equitable manner, for public purposes only . . . .”).
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Clause. As a result, a strong public purpose could overcome a seemingly high
tax rate and allow for a constitutional tax, whereas a weak public purpose
would require an increased degree of reasonableness in the marginal or actual
tax rate/increase. By adopting such a balancing test—instead of strictly con-
struing each clause as an independent and insular limitation on municipal tax-
ing and spending power—the North Carolina Supreme Court could have
created a system that both protects the public from inequitable taxation and
allows municipalities to wield the tax code as a tool in regulatory enforcement.
Even if the state Supreme Court had interpreted the North Carolina Con-
stitution to allow municipalities, under the Just and Equitable Clause, to levy
higher taxes against sweepstakes, several practical considerations make the
privilege license method of regulating sweepstakes parlors impractical. For
one, a state statute prohibits municipalities from charging any privilege license
fee at all for games deemed illegal.105 This statutory prohibition, however, is
widely ignored, yielding significant tax revenue for municipalities, forcing
municipalities to face the dilemma of whether to raise privilege license fees or
to fully prosecute the sweepstakes parlors to drive them out of business.106 For
example, since 2007, the City of Raleigh has collected over $1.76 million in
privilege license fees from sweepstakes parlors107—that essentially represents
1.76 million reasons not to prosecute or continue raising licensing rates to a
level that would put this lucrative tax base completely out of business. Further,
and most importantly, another legislative shift would have to occur in the state
to allow higher privilege taxes on sweepstakes parlors, as the State Legislature
has recently abolished the power of municipalities to sell any privilege license
at all.108
B. Municipal Land Use Ordinances as a Potential Source of Regulatory
Control
The controversial battle between municipalities and sweepstakes parlors
has necessitated the use of municipal law doctrines, which are often either
devoid of precedent or employed in a manner that would not allow appellate
courts to rule on their constitutionality. As Professor David Owens, from the
105 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-307 (2007).
106 See generally, Chris Berendt, Legislators Say Sweepstakes Illegal, but Continue Opera-
tions Under Uncertainty, CLINTONNC.COM (last updated Jan. 29, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://
www.clintonnc.com/news/home_top-news/3485554/Legislators-say-sweepstakes-illegal-but-
continue-operations-under-uncertainty (noting that under the terms of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
307, the small town of Clinton, North Carolina lost revenue of $70,000 per year once sweep-
stakes parlors were “considered illegal and, thus, not subject to be taxed”); Thomasi McDon-
ald, Raleigh Issues Licenses for an Industry Banned by NC Lawmakers, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (June 3, 2014), at 1A (noting that the City Attorney for Raleigh “declined to
comment when asked whether the city’s willingness to issue a license to a sweepstakes
parlor contradicts the General Assembly’s ban,” and further noting that each privilege
license issued by Raleigh costs $20,000.00).
107 McDonald, supra note 106.
108 Joe Killian, Greensboro to Lose $3.2 Million in Privilege-License Taxes, NEWS & REC.
(June 3, 2014, 12:27 AM), http://www.news-record.com/news/government/article_5965308c
-ead7-11e3-8fbe-0017a43b2370.html (noting that in the summer of 2014, the state legisla-
ture passed and the governor signed a bill abolishing business privilege-license taxes).
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University of North Carolina School of Government has hypothesized, it is
possible for municipalities within the state to use zoning ordinances to prohibit
the operation of sweepstakes parlors within their jurisdiction, although the con-
cept certainly forces municipal legislatures to wade in murky legal waters.109
1. Could the Legal Reasoning of Robins v. Town of Hillsborough110
Make a Comeback?
Although not directly connected to gaming law, in Robins v. Town of
Hillsborough, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether a zon-
ing ordinance banning otherwise lawful activity within its borders was a valid
exercise of the Municipal Legislature’s authority.111 In its discussion, the Court
of Appeals noted that “[z]oning authority under the police power ‘is subject to
the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon the legislative power forbid-
ding arbitrary and unduly discriminatory interference with the rights of prop-
erty owners,’”112 because zoning regulations, “restrict the use of private
property to promote the health, the public safety, the public morals, or public
welfare.”113 However, the Court of Appeals realized that the zoning power that
Hillsborough attempted to exercise by completely prohibiting manufacturing
asphalt within its territory warranted a higher level of scrutiny, and thus turned
to other states to find the applicable standard.114
The appellate court looked to Pennsylvania and Michigan law for gui-
dance in situations where zoning ordinances totally prohibited legitimate busi-
nesses from operating.115 Adopting their reasoning, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals determined that if an applicant can show that an ordinance is a total
ban on a legitimate use, the burden shifts to the municipality to show that the
ordinance is valid.116 While this might seem like a clear and concise statement
of the law, the North Carolina Supreme Court abandoned the appellate court’s
reasoning by deciding the case on other grounds, vacating the appellate court’s
109 David Owens, Land Use Regulation of Internet Sweepstakes Cafes, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T
COATES’ CANONS: NC LOC. GOV’T. L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/
?p=6577 (enunciating the possibility that, at least in theory, cities and towns in North Caro-
lina could pass land use ordinances to ban sweepstakes parlors from operating within city
limits).
110 625 S.E.2d 813 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) [hereinafter Hillsborough I], rev’d on other
grounds, 639 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. 2007).
111 Id. at 815 (stating that the facts that gave rise to the dispute occurred when the Hillsbor-
ough Board of Commissioners adopted an ordinance that banned the manufacturing and
processing of asphalt within the city limits).
112 Id. at 818 (quoting Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 160 S.E.2d 430, 434).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 818–19.
115 Id. at 819 (quoting Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 215 N.W. 2d 179, 185 (Mich.
1974) (“[A]n ordinance which totally excludes from a municipality a use recognized by the
Constitution . . . as legitimate also carries with it a strong taint of unlawful discrimination
and a denial of equal property of the law as to the excluded use.”) (emphasis in original);
Exton Quarries Inc., v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 179 (Pa. 1967) (citations
omitted) (“The constitutionality of zoning ordinances which totally prohibit legitimate busi-
nesses . . . should be regarded with particular circumspection.”)).
116 Id. at 818.
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standard of review.117 As a result, there is no North Carolina common law to
reference when analyzing whether municipalities have the constitutional power
to pass ordinances completely banning sweepstakes parlors from operating
within their borders.
There is no doubt that on account of their police powers, North Carolina
municipalities have the authority to enact ordinances designed to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the target population.118 Therefore, when a
municipality seeks to enact an ordinance that completely bans an activity like
sweepstakes operations, the only remaining questions are: (1) whether the ordi-
nance was enacted pursuant to police powers; and (2) the standard of review to
apply.119
As to the first question, there is little doubt that such an ordinance would
be found to be within the municipality’s police power. Although North Caro-
lina courts have found an absence of police power where municipalities have
attempted to ban activities that were neither a nuisance, nor a threat to the
health, safety, or welfare of the public, an ordinance banning sweepstakes gam-
ing would likely be a distinctive case.120 Nevertheless, the census data sur-
rounding the placement of sweepstakes parlors in North Carolina is staggering:
most parlors are placed in neighborhoods with strict, though informal, racial
boundaries, and whose residents are lucky if they have incomes that touch the
117 Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 639 S.E.2d 421, 425 (N.C. 2007) [hereinafter Hillsbor-
ough II] (“Because of our holding, we need not address the portion of the Court of Appeals
opinion concerning the constitutionality of the amended zoning ordinance except to note that
the Court of Appeals unnecessarily addressed the issue.”).
118 G.I. Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 125 S.E.2d 764, 767 (N.C. 1962) (noting that sover-
eigns, including municipalities, have, through their police power, the authority to enact legis-
lation to “protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society”
(quoting State v. Balance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C. 1949)).
119 It appears that, although the case law certainly still remains open to interpretation, a
municipal ordinance—even one banning businesses from operating outright—might be con-
sidered constitutional if the ordinance was deemed to be a valid exercise of the municipal
police power and was not seen as “arbitrary and capricious.” See Hillsborough I, 625 S.E.2d
813 at 818 (noting that municipal zoning ordinances are to be evaluated as an exercise of
municipal police powers); Owens, supra note 109 (explaining that there is legal ambiguity
surrounding what standard of review would be applicable to evaluating municipal zoning
ordinances that ban sweepstakes parlors). This is because North Carolina precedent suggests
that determining the validity of an exercise of police power only requires an evaluation of
the legislative intent behind an act or ordinance, while evaluating the same action under a
given standard of review—such as whether the action is arbitrary or capricious—is a test of
the constitutional “fit.” See State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 226 (N.C. 1921) (Allen, J., con-
curring) (“The right to bear arms, which is protected and safeguarded by federal [sic] and
state [sic] Constitutions, is subject to the authority of the General Assembly, in the exercise
of the police power, to regulate; but the regulation must be reasonable and not prohibitive,
and must bear a fair relation to the preservation of the public peace and safety.”). Kerner,
therefore, is evidence of a judicial bifurcation of (1) police power and (2) independent stan-
dard of review when reviewing state acts or ordinances, requiring both to have adequate
authority and reasonable relation to government interest for a law to pass constitutional
muster.
120 See Town of Conover v. Jolly, 177 S.E.2d 879, 881 (N.C. 1970) (finding that a munici-
pality was not acting pursuant to police powers where it banned residents from maintaining a
mobile home in some places, as mobile homes were neither a public nuisance, nor a threat to
the health, safety, or welfare of the population).
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poverty line.121 Investigations into sweepstakes parlors in other states have
shown a link between lax laws concerning sweepstakes and the proliferation of
crime.122 This has caused at least one town’s counsel to question whether
sweepstakes parlors had a direct negative effect on the well being of the town’s
citizens.123 Concerns about the potentially negative financial impact that
sweepstakes parlors have on a vulnerable citizenry were, in fact, a factor when
the State Senate decided to ban the operations in 2010.124 Beyond these con-
cerns, opponents of these parlors complain that the businesses almost uniformly
contribute to urban blight, as many have blacked out windows, operate on a
temporary basis in strip malls, and hinder the ability to attract “legitimate”
commercial businesses.125
Given the more than adequate factual basis supporting the notion that a
municipality attempting to ban sweepstakes parlors through a zoning ordinance
would be acting within its police powers, the only question would be as to what
standard of review the ordinance would be examined under. Professor Owens
believes that the reviewing court would adopt the “arbitrary and capricious
standard” when evaluating the ban.126 After an in-depth consideration of poten-
tially applicable standards, this author believes that Professor Owens is likely
correct.
The key question to determine if a case would trigger a Hillsborough I
burden-shifting standard is if the ordinance was a complete ban of a legitimate,
121 See Lisa Sorg & Joe Schwartz, Sweepstakes Cafes: Coming to Your Low-Income Neigh-
borhood, INDYWEEK (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/sweepstakes-
cafes-coming-to-your-low-income-neighborhood/Content?oid=1300495 (noting that sweep-
stakes parlors in Raleigh and Durham were often located near pawn shops or similar busi-
nesses, in communities where 25-50% of residents live in poverty, and whose populations
are 80-96% African-American).
122 Tom Abate, California Deems Internet ‘Sweepstakes’ Illegal but Alameda County Looks
Sideways, CASTRO VALLEY PATCH (May 7, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://patch.com/california/
castrovalley/california-deems-internet-sweepstakes-illegal-but-alaa29e6bffa9#.VC2enmdAS
Uk (noting that the California DOJ’s Bureau of Gambling Control experiences a large
increase in reported crimes when new sweepstakes parlors open); Walter Jones, Op-Ed.,
Sweepstakes Industry Floods Georgia and Florida Drawing Fans and Foes, TIMES-HERALD
(Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.times-herald.com/opinion/op-ed/jones/Sweepstakes-industry-
floods-Georgia---and-Florida-drawing-fans-and-foes--1856471 (noting that the Ga. Bureau
of Investigation found that some sweepstakes parlor owners had out-of-state criminal
records).
123 See generally, Nash Dunn, Town to Rule on Clayton Sweepstakes Parlor, CLAYTON
STAR-NEWS (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.claytonnewsstar.com/2014/08/29/4102605/town-
to-rule-on-clayton-sweepstakes.html (noting that Councilman Michael Grannis of Clayton
had questioned, when determining whether or not to issue a business license to a sweep-
stakes, how the business would affect the “safety and well-being” of the town’s citizens).
124 See Patrick Gannon, N.C. Senate Vote to Ban Sweepstakes Parlors Likely, STAR-NEWS
ONLINE (last updated June 17, 2010, 9:24 PM), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/2010
0617/ARTICLES/100619668 (stating that proponents of anti-sweepstakes bill focused on the
‘predatory’ nature of the industry).
125 See generally, e.g., Lisa Sorg, The Hayti Mural and the Durham Divide, INDYWEEK
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/the-hayti-mural-and-the-durham-
divide/Content?oid=4242301 (noting that areas affected by urban blight have trouble
attracting economic invest from legitimate businesses and instead are only attractive to
places such as sweepstakes parlors).
126 Owens, supra note 109.
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lawful business enterprise.127 Despite the legal ambiguity that currently exists
on account of software evolution, the North Carolina legislature has declared
sweepstakes parlors to be unlawful enterprises. In fact, police are permitted to
arrest, and district attorneys are permitted to charge, those who operate sweep-
stakes parlors in violation of the law.128 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any
sweepstakes parlor promoter or operator who challenges the law will be able to
successfully argue that the municipality is specifically targeting and excluding
their legitimate business interest. Instead, the reviewing court will likely con-
clude that the ordinance, if exercised within the municipality’s police power, is
constitutional so long as the ordinance is not arbitrary and applies uniformly to
all persons similarly situated.129 This standard only requires the court to engage
in a rational basis review.130 As long as the municipality could link any of the
above-mentioned negative effects to sweepstakes parlors, it is likely that an
ordinance completely banning their operation from within the city limits would
be upheld.
2. What Would Such an Ordinance Look Like?
After determining that a North Carolina municipality has the constitutional
power to pass an ordinance banning the operation of all sweepstakes parlors,
the question then becomes: What would such an ordinance look like? A sample
constitutional ordinance might read:
WHEREAS, the Town of ___ has decided, through reasoned analysis
and decision, that the operation of gambling operations, including
sweepstakes parlors, has a detrimental effect on the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens;
THEREFORE, the operation of a business which uses one or more
machines, whether mechanical or electronic, for the purposes of
allowing the public, invited customers, or any other person to engage in
sweepstakes, games of chance, or games of luck that produces, as its
main objective, a prize tendered in cash or cash equivalent, to be used
as commonly accepted currency, irrespective of whether the prize is
predetermined and not dependent on whether entries are provided free
of charge, purchased outright, or tied to the purchase of a related or
unrelated product sold in, by, or for use in the same or similar establish-
127 See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text.
128 Julian March, Sweepstakes Operators Face Crackdowns after Change in Law, STAR-
NEWS ONLINE (Jan. 21, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20130121/
ARTICLES/130129973 (noting that sweepstakes operators have received cease and desist
letters threatening steep fines and/or prosecution).
129 For North Carolina’s standard of review of municipal ordinances, see Shuford v. Town
of Waynesville, 198 S.E. 585, 588 (N.C. 1938) (noting that a municipal ordinance is valid as
long as it is not arbitrary and applies uniformly to all people similarly situated).
130 See Town of Atlantic Beach v. Young, 298 S.E.2d 686, 690-91 (N.C. 1983) (“In order to
determine whether this ordinance is unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreasonable we look to
see if the ordinance is reasonably related to the accomplishment of a legitimate state objec-
tive” (citing Raleigh Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 174 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. 1970);
State v. Whitaker, 45 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1947))).
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ment, is expressly prohibited in the Town of ____ and its extraterritorial
zoning jurisdiction.131
Although, not designed to be a complete recitation of what an ordinance
would look like, the above ordinance is demonstrative of one that would likely
pass constitutional muster. Such an ordinance would avoid the constitutional
trappings of First Amendment regulation, as it focuses on the ban of conduct
incidental to speech, not expression.132 In addition, such an ordinance bans all
games, even if their outcomes are predetermined or based on the customer’s
skill. The above ordinance would also prohibit sweepstakes parlors from skirt-
ing the regulation by arguing that customers are simply buying an unrelated
product, not a sweepstakes entry.
Finally, although sweepstakes promoters and courts in North Carolina
have made arguments that section 14-306.4 is unconstitutionally overbroad
because it could be interpreted to prohibit other legal activities—like the opera-
tion of traditional video games—the model ordinance proposed above should
protect a municipality from such challenges because it only prohibits the use of
games that give prizes in cash or readily transferrable currency. Arcade games
that distribute tickets would not be banned, as the main purpose of these games
is not necessarily to win a prize but to play a game of skill. The prizes given at
arcades—normally in the form of tickets, coins or vouchers—are not readily
redeemable as cash or its equivalent outside of that particular establishment.
While it is possible that a gaming parlor could transition to a ticket-based prize
system, the ordinance should still bar the operation of such an establishment on
the premise that the primary purpose of all of its games is to win tickets for a
prize. By tying the decree to a proclamation that the ordinance is strictly tied to
the municipality’s exercise of its police power, such an ordinance should—
when drafted in a manner that fully explicates the terms of the text—survive
constitutional challenges while simultaneously remaining broad enough to ban
targeted activities, protect permitted ones, and stifle (at least for a short time)
creative attempts to reconfigure the sweepstakes so as to fall outside a munici-
pal ordinance.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article offers no opinions or judgments on the morality of legal gam-
bling; North Carolina, however, has made its public policy concerns about
gambling clear through a series of recent legislative and judicial decisions. In
an effort to end gambling, the state legislature passed, and the judiciary upheld,
a series of statutes designed to prohibit most forms of gambling. However,
through a loophole in a 2007 statute, sweepstakes parlors began to form and
131 For an example of a proposed, although not adopted, ordinance placing strict regulations
on sweepstakes operations without banning them outright, see Lumberton, N.C., Ordinance
Regulating Electronic Gaming Operation (Jan. 13, 2014), available at http://lumbertoncitync
.iqm2.com/Citizens/FileOpen.aspx?Type=30&ID=4424.
132 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘non-
speech’ [sic] elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech [sic] element can justify incidental limita-
tions on First Amendment freedoms.”).
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operate, morphing into an industry that employs thousands of people and gener-
ates revenue estimated at $10 billion per year.133
Despite the best efforts by North Carolina legislators, district attorneys,
and law enforcement personnel, the creativity and ingenuity of sweepstakes
operators continues to place sweepstakes in a gray area of the law. Because of
the perpetual cat-and-mouse game played between sweepstakes parlors and the
state legislature, this article argues that the only truly effective regulation of the
industry can come at the municipal level.
This article has identified two primary methodologies which municipali-
ties can use to try and effectively prohibit sweepstakes parlors: (1) increasing
privilege tax burdens; and (2) using restrictive land use ordinances. However,
since the state legislature recently revoked municipal power to levy privilege
license fees, and because the state Supreme Court has narrowly defined the
scope of the state constitution’s Just and Equitable Clause, taxation is not a
readily available regulatory tool for municipalities. Despite this, localities
remain free to employ land use regulations to prohibit sweepstakes parlors from
operating within their jurisdictions.134 Although these types of ordinances may
face constitutional challenges, and although there is little case law on the sub-
ject, if written well, these ordinances can pass constitutional muster and effec-
tively accomplish what the State Legislature has failed to do.
133 Peter J. Kulick & Robert W. Stocker II, The Wild West of Unregulated Gambling:
Binary Options and Internet Cafe´s, CASINO ENTER. MGMT (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.casino
enterprisemanagement.com/articles/february-2014/wild-west-unregulated-gambling-binary-
options-and-internet-cafe´s.
134 See, e.g., THOMASVILLE, N.C., MUN. CODE ch. 18, art. 14, §§ 18.285–295 (2013), avail-
able at www.thomasville.org/DocumentCenter/Download/City_Ordinances/Chapter_18_
Taxation_Revenue__Miscellaneous_Business_Regulations/Chapter_18_Taxation_Revenue_
and_other.pdf; Amanda Dolasinski, Lumberton Officials Take Aim at Video Gambling with
New Ordinance, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, http://www.fayobserver.com/news/local/lumber
ton-officials-take-aim-at-video-gambling-with-new-ordinance/article_7b1909e8-e573-5322-
abb1-ef6e5be44542.html (last updated May 12, 2014, 11:00 PM).
